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ABSTRACT 
 
Effects of terrorist acts on financial world have been extensively studied in the past few 
decades. There is no doubt that terrorist acts affect the investor sentiment as it has been 
documented in numerous papers (e.g. Nikkinen and Vähämaa 2010; Drakos 2010; 
Chesney, Reshetar and Karaman 2010). Most of the previous studies have attempted to 
capture if certain selected events affected asset prices, how long such possible effects last 
and what characteristics of terrorism drive change in investor sentiment. The purpose of 
this thesis is to study if the investor sentiment to terror attacks has decreased over the past 
two and a half decades, in other words whether investors have grown numb to terrorist 
attacks. This study contributes to the existing literature by providing a prolonged 
examination of effects that modern terrorism has on stock markets. Time period used in 
the study ranges from 1995 to the end of 2017. Forty terrorist attacks are examined from 
the S&P 500, Euro Stoxx 50, FTSE 100, MSCI Europe and MSCI World indices.  
 
Results of the empirical study suggest that, unlike hypothesized in this thesis, investor 
sentiment to terrorism hasn’t decreased but instead increased: investors’ negative reaction 
got in fact stronger from more recent attacks. Explanatory regressions also contribute to 
these results, by showing that between 1995 and 2010 cumulative abnormal returns were 
higher during the attack days. Significant results suggest that the number of people killed 
and wounded in the attack affected investor sentiment negatively.  Individual 
characteristics of the attacks didn’t affect the investor sentiment in any negative way. 
______________________________________________________________________                  
KEYWORDS: Investor sentiment, Terrorism, Event study, Risk taking, Abnormal 
returns
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Every day investors receive tens if not hundreds of news that can alter their investment 
decisions, their sentiment. With social media, internet and globalization the extent and 
pace of news coverage have changed, as almost all of the information is available to 
consumers at the very instant the news agencies get a hold of them. When one faces 
hundreds of very relevant and somewhat relevant news each day, it leads to the inevitable 
question whether the human mind has grown numb to the news? It’s dubious, if anything 
can surprise investors anymore, especially relating to terrorism as the most horrible 
terrorist attack in human history that occurred on September 11th, 2001, showed that 
markets do recover rather fast even after such massive attacks (Nikkinen and Vähämaa 
2010).  
 
Instabilities caused by unpredictable events can have a drastic negative or a positive 
impact on the economy. There are numerous studies that have documented the change in 
stock returns after important sports events like the Super Bowl (Payne, Tresl and Friesen 
2018). Even more important events and news that have a straightforward effect are 
corporate news like stock split announcements, news about executive appointments or 
simply earnings announcements affect how the investors perceive the future of certain 
companies and are therefore reflected in the prices of stocks (Pevzner, Xie and Xin 2015; 
Bessembinder and Zhang 2013). Leaning on these observations it may be expected that 
investors will also react to the news that shake the world, destroy infrastructure and cause 
loss of human lives, and cause extra costs to the economy.  
 
Investors reaction to the prevailing situation in the world and their expectations about the 
future of the financial markets is called an investor sentiment. When the investor 
sentiment about the future is high, the stock prices keep rising, and the market situation 
is called bullish. When the investors are not trusting that in the near future the market will 
be doing well, the stock market prices can be seen sliding down and talks about bearish 
markets begin.  The Efficient Market Hypothesis assumes all news are rationally 
evaluated and reflected in the stock prices according to the impact of the news. There are 
however different behavioural biases that affect the investor sentiment and go against the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Chan, Jegadeesh 
and Lakonishok (1996) argue in their research that investors are rather slow to 
intercorporate news in their short-term beliefs about the market and rather continue to 
reflect the pattern of thoughts that has prevailed before. In other words, if the company’s 
returns in past years have been good and their view on their business situation hasn’t 
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changed, investors expect the pattern to continue, despite occasional news that could 
signal risks for the whole financial market. The same goes also for companies that have 
been on the losing end of the spectrum, with returns that don’t satisfy the investors. When 
it comes to events that don’t affect one company in particular, but rather the infrastructure 
of the country, investors could be hesitant to reflect the news to the stock prices. One can 
also think that some companies can even benefit from the terrorist attacks that destroy 
infrastructure, as the consequences must be repaired and this means orders and more work 
for certain business sectors.  
 
Terrorist attacks are the kind of events that cause significant chaos, destruction and in 
extreme cases loss of human lives. Terrorism fuelled by religious and political beliefs 
isn’t a new phenomenon, the first documented “terror” events can be traced back to the 
11th century but it’s presumed that it has been around for even longer period of time. The 
word terrorism comes from the French expression “regime de la terreur” that occurred in 
the late 18th century, but the French expression derives from the Latin word “terrere” to 
frighten (Burgess 2015, Walker 2001).  
 
Even today terrorism doesn’t have any uniform international definition, but every country 
and political organization tries to give terrorism some definition of their own. The most 
definitive explanation of term terrorism was given by Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation stating that: “means any act of violence or threat thereof not withstanding its 
motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan 
with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperilling their lives, 
honour, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public 
or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national 
resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, 
political unity or sovereignty of independent States” (Pawlak 2015). 
 
What has changed over the centuries and even past few decades is how the acts of 
terrorism are executed. The goal of terrorism has always been to cause as much fear, 
destruction, lack of confidence and even death as possible. For that purpose, the big 
attacks are the most effective, such as plane crashes similar to in Lockerbie in 1988 or 
huge bombings akin to Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, or even combinations of these 
two in the case of the terror event that occurred on 11th of September 2001. Today these 
kinds of acts are rather hard to implement, due to the counterterrorism actions, that 
countries have been investing in, resulting in spotting the big terror attacks in their 
planning phases and preventing the attacks of being carried out.  Therefore, smaller 
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attacks that do not require a lot of equipment, like a van speeding into a human groups, 
have been becoming more general, meaning that terror attack can occur almost anywhere 
at any time.  
 
In the past few years due to a rapid development in information technology (IT) terrorism 
has crossed past the line of physical attacks into a cyber world. Cyber terrorism is a rather 
new threat to the world and attacks have increased each year, bringing new threats to 
globalized world and through that to financial world. In Worldwide threat assessment 
report made by National Intelligence of the United States, cyber threats are categorized 
as one of the largest threats of the globalized world (2018). This can be a massive game 
changer also in financial world, as the markets have switched to electronic format and 
cloud-based databases. By doing so they expose themselves to enormous risk of cyber 
terrorism, that could crash the market and cause extreme havoc like the Stuxnet virus 
caused in the Iranian power plants.  
 
 
1.1 Prior research  
 
This study is influenced by research papers by Nikkinen and Vähämää (2010) and 
Chesney, Reshetar and Karaman (2011). They and many researches that also studied the 
effects of terrorism on investor sentiment come to the conclusion that the immediate 
effects on day of the terrorism and few after it are significant and are reflected in stock 
market sentiment, but the effect is momentary and that investor sentiment and stock 
market reaction to terrorism is short term and isn’t reflected in stock prices in the long 
run.  
 
One of the extensive studies was done by Drakos (2010), where he studies multiple terror 
attacks from 1994 to 2004, with the conclusion that the terror attacks affect stock returns 
in a negative way. His study also suggests that the number of fatal casualties caused by 
the attack has an effect on how markets react to the event.  
 
Study by Goel, Cagle and Shawky (2017) studies how fast the markets rebound after the 
attack, same kind of sub-study was also made by Nikkinen and Vähämaa (2010). The 
conclusion in both studies was that there is a significant effect of the terror attacks on the 
stock market, but markets rebound to the pre-attack returns very quickly.   
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The effect of terror attack can easily spill to other markets also as was recorded in study 
by Nikkinen, Omran, Sahlström and Aijö (2008) and Kumar and Liu (2013). While the 
Nikkinen et al. focuses on studying how 9/11 was reflected on 53 different markets, 
Kumar and Liu provide explanations to the possible spillover effect. Markets that had a 
tight trading partnership with each other reacted more significantly to each other’s terror 
events.  
 
 
1.2 Purpose of the study and the contribution to the existing literature 
 
In the core of the financial theory is the Efficient Market Theory. The Efficient Market 
Theory states that the markets are rational, but the investors not so much and therefore 
the in the short-term time period there could be lags in how information is reflected in the 
stock prices, as investors react firstly with their feelings especially to the negative news, 
instead of Fama’s proposition of the Brownian effect (Barberis. Shleifer and Vishny 
1998; Baker, Wurgler and Yuan 2012; Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok 1996). 
 
This study focuses on the terrorist attacks that occurred between the beginning of January 
1995 until the end of 2017. Filtration of the attacks was applied to include only attacks 
that occurred in Europe (excluding Turkey and Israel, but including Russia) and United 
States, and also focusing on the attacks targeted towards civilians, therefore excluding 
the attacks where the military was a target group. To capture the investor sentiment this 
study focuses on stock indices FTSE 100, Euro Stoxx 50, S&P 500, MSCI Europe and 
MSCI World. Article by Nikkinen, Omran, Sahlström and Äijö (2008) supports that not 
all regions have the same reaction to terrorist attacks and capture that European and U.S. 
markets reflect each other’s moves in the stock market post September 11th attack and in 
some extent Asian market follows them too.   
 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether the investors have grown numb to 
terrorist attacks. Increasing media coverage should increase the fear expectations, but 
previous studies that have proven that the effect of the terrorism on the stock market is 
not long lasting (Melnick and Eldor 2004). Researches have proven that markets rebound 
after few weeks if not days to the pre-attack state (Nikkinen & Vähämaa 2010). Despite 
Melnick and Eldor (2004) providing the evidence that location of the terror attack has no 
effects, this article assumes that increasing amount of terrorist attacks in western world 
and wider coverage by media has larger effect on investors, as was suggested in study by 
Jetter (2017:32). 
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Contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is an aim to provide an extensive 
overview of the terrorist events in the developed countries and evaluate if the terrorism 
as a phenomenon still has an effect on the markets and should be studied in the future. 
Also, the investors reaction captured in this study could provide information of investors 
behaviour and the way they evaluate events through stock pricing.  
 
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
 
The study is organized as follows. The first chapter acts as an introduction to the topic 
this thesis discusses. Important previous studies this thesis leans on are briefly introduced, 
the research questions are presented as well as the main drivers behind the study, purpose 
and the way this thesis contributes to the existing literature.  
 
The second chapter is a brief introduction to terrorism. First the chapter discusses the 
political risk from a financial perspective in order to provide a general picture of what 
end results of terrorism could be expected, as terrorism is one form of political risks. Then 
terrorism as a phenomenon is described in more detail, focusing on of the effects of 
terrorism on the economy and probability of terrorism effect occurring in the western 
countries. Economic aspects, as certain terrorism events are described in more detail in 
their own subsections.  
 
Chapter three focuses on describing the investor sentiment. Chapter begins with the 
theory of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, weaving it into the investor sentiment theorem 
and how the previous literature has viewed investor sentiment as an important factor in 
the asset pricing models, where it should be taken into account.  
 
The fourth chapter’s focus is on previous literature about the effects of terrorism on 
investor sentiment and what factors the previous studies have shown affecting the investor 
sentiment during the terror attacks.  
 
Chapter five provides the hypothesis of this study in detail and also describes the sample 
data that was used to perform the event study to test the hypothesis. Data is evaluated in 
the subsection of the chapter and the refining method is described. In the last subsection 
the empirical models used in this study are described in detail, providing the reader with 
the understanding how the results of the study were acquired.  
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Chapter six focuses solely on the results of the empirical study and their analysis. Chapter 
seven is a conclusive chapter of the study, summing up the results with the previous 
findings in the literature.   
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2. POLITICAL RISKS AND ACTS OF TERRORISM   
 
Terrorism is not a recent phenomenon. First documentation of terrorism, as we widely 
define it today, can be found in the beginning of the Common Era (Burgess 2015, Walker 
2001). However, globalization, internet and media make it look like terrorism is a recent 
phenomenon and that terrorism event occurrence has increased in the past few decades. 
In reality the amount of terrorism events has decreased due to strict counterterrorism 
measures that for example European Union has taken to fight the terrorism in the past 
decade (Zimmermann 2011; Jetter 2017). But in the past two decades terrorism has 
changed and developed in, some could say intelligent ways, so that it threatens not only 
human lives, overall safety and infrastructure, but also even more the financial world.  
 
This chapter focuses on describing modern terrorism, how it affects the society from the 
economy viewpoint and provides analysis about the possible future forms of terrorism 
and what that would mean to economy and finance. 
 
 
2.1 Political risks  
 
Financial literature on political risks and their effect on the financial markets has been 
studied for years with different methodologies and for different purposes. The definition 
of political risk is according to Huang, Wu, Yu and Zhang (2015) is that it’s a risk that 
arises from action of government or the risks are somehow related to the political actions, 
such as legislations, government policies or actions that affect the structure and activities 
of the country. Political risks are as much injurious to private investors as to institutional 
investors and companies. Countries with high political risks often suffer from the 
increased corruption that could have a negative effect on the future expected cash flows 
of the companies (Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegl 2016).  
 
While terrorism isn’t the most common political risk, it is categorized as a political event 
as it more often than not carries a political message, or it aims to cause a disorder in the 
country which will affect the political choices. The counterterrorism measures are also 
executed by the government and therefore results and analysis of studies that handle 
political risks can also be applied in the cases of terrorism events.  
 
The most extreme political events are wars, which affect not only the everyday lives of 
people, but also the economy and in the end on investor sentiment (Wisniewski 2016: 
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18). Consequences of increase in political risks are such as capital flight as documented 
by Lensink, Hermes and Murinde (2000). In risky situations, fear fills minds of investors 
who withdraw their investments from the riskier countries and riskier assets and invest in 
safer countries with a very good investor protection legislation like the United States. 
There are numerous studies on different assets that have a reputation of being a safe 
haven. Hood and Malik (2013) studied whether gold acts better as a safe haven than the 
CBOE Volatility Index known as VIX. They argue that in fact VIX is a far better safe 
haven and a hedge tool than traditional safe haven asset, gold.   
 
When looking at the geographic breakdown of terrorism one can note that most terrorist 
attacks occurred in countries with already high political risks, as top ten countries sorted 
by most terrorist attacks in 2016 were in some kind of political conflict (Global Terrorism 
Index 2017: 21-41). Most of the conflict countries are autocratic and that by itself is an 
explanatory factor of for example low returns as research by Lahkonen and Heimonen 
(2015) indicates. Democratic countries are more agile to changes in government policies 
and external factors. Parotti and van Oijen (2001) study whether emerging economies 
benefit from decrease of political risk and the results of their study suggest that the 
benefits are significant for the overall financial market of these countries and therefore 
the total stock returns also tend to increase when the political risk decreases.  
 
Usually studies of political risks concentrate on countries with a high political risk factors, 
as of course the effects of the risk are much easier to detect in these countries. These 
studies however are a good example of what could be expected to happen after the 
terrorist attacks in the developed countries like the United Kingdom or France, even if 
the effects would be much weaker. If the investor sentiment drops due to terrorist attacks 
will the investors redirect their investments to the countries that they consider safer or 
redirect their assets to safe havens? 
 
 
2.2 Terrorism  
 
In the past few decades there were several devastating terror attacks in the western world, 
that have shaped modern understanding of terrorism and most likely, it will be changing 
once more. Daniel R. Coats from National Intelligence of the United States has pointed 
out that terrorism continues to be one of the main threats for the world, with cyber threats 
(including cyber terrorism) increasingly growing into a major global threat (2018). Goel, 
Cagle and Shwaky write on terrorism the following: “Great societal harm comes from a 
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sense of fear and helplessness within communities, which erodes consumer confidence 
and consequently stunts economies, which can lead to a real slowdown in the economic 
development of nations” (2017: 120.) 
 
When talking about international terrorism the problem is how to define it. There is not 
one coherent definition of what terrorism is and every country and union define 
differently what kind of actions can be considered terrorism. Arif and Suleman (2017) 
describe terrorism as a “tactic designed to set in oppressiveness and fear, aimed to attain 
a religious, political, economic or social objective. It is defined as an action with a purpose 
focused on explicit targets scattered over numerous geographical locations and is highly 
unpredictable. Unlike other disasters, where the predictions for the occurrence of such 
events are possible, there is a very little possibility of predicting terrorism. It 
predominantly comprises the use of explosives and firearms. Moreover, the reaction time 
after identification of a potential terrorist event is substantially limited when compared to 
other disasters. This innate suddenness of terrorist events may initiate societal reaction 
by disrupting markets” (366.) Despite the varying definition across nations and 
organizations, all agree, that it’s a very aggressive and violent form of usually political 
attack with an aim to cause either serious damage to infrastructure or great number of 
human casualties, usually both. Terrorism is always an unpredicted attack that carries a 
negative message and outcome.  
 
While the financial market instability is not always the main purpose of the terrorism, 
terrorism always affects the markets, as the financial markets are one of the corner stones 
of modern societies. Terrorism affects financial markets through three ways. First: 
international trading may suffer and experience increased costs of trade due to postponed 
shipments and also loss of trading goods in a terror act. Trading can also be hindered due 
to a stricter regulations and customs. Secondly: terrorism affects companies who can slow 
down or discard their investment plans altogether. Also, companies operating in terrorist 
countries can face unexpected costs of destroyed property and goods. Thirdly terrorism 
increases investors fear about the future, in other words sentiment, which shows up as 
increased volatility on stock markets and increased withdrawal of risky stocks to safe 
haven assets such as gold, because risk avoidance increases as bad investor sentiment 
increases (Essaddam and Karagianis 2014:89). 
 
Effects of terrorism can be roughly separated to direct and indirect, where the direct 
effects or costs are those that are straightforward for example: human life losses, damage 
to infrastructure and property. Effects that are caused to economy are considered indirect, 
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as they are caused for example through change in consumer behaviour or loss of 
investors’ confidence in the market situation. Usually the effects of terrorism on economy 
are negative, meaning that investors in fear of market uncertainty or further attacks 
withdraw their investments to the safer countries (Kumar and Liu 2013: 42).  
 
Several studies focusing on economic effects of terrorism have documented that 
economic consequences are not only experienced by the country that was targeted by the 
terrorism act, but also other countries. The effects are especially experienced by important 
trading partners of the country under the terror attack (Kumar and Liu 2013).  Study by 
Melnick and Eldor (2004) suggests that frequent and prolonged periods of terrorism 
didn’t desensitize the financial markets, which served as a motivator for this thesis to 
study if over time with frequent terrorism occurrences have lessened investor sentiment 
and therefore have milder effect during the terrorist act on stock market.  
 
Analysis in the Global Terrorism Index from 2017 showed that in 2016, in developed 
countries, ISIS was the main terrorist group behind continuing terrorism acts. And despite 
the fact that deaths from terrorism declined, for OECD countries 2016 was deadliest year 
(excluding 2001 when the attack 9/11 occurred) since 1988 and for Europe deadliest year 
was 2014 (Global Terrorism Database, Global terrorism index 2017:3) 
 
The development of the past few years has seen a shift in the target group of the terrorists 
in developed countries. Instead of targeting military troops, like the trend was in 1980’s, 
for example with Irish separatist, the recent trend has been to target civilians, as this 
causes larger disruption and also the size of the attacks has switched towards smaller 
attacks as they are much easier to carry out until the end (Global terrorism index 2017:57) 
The spreading trend of terrorism can affect the investor sentiment. Looking at the 
statistics in 2006 there were 106 countries that had experienced at least one terrorist 
attack, meaning that only 30 countries in the world hadn’t experienced any terror attacks 
at all. When compared to 2002 when there were 44 countries that hadn’t experienced 
terrorism, the trend of spreading is obvious (Global terrorism index 2017:14-15). 
Assuming that investors act according to semi-strong form of market efficiency and have 
access to this information, these facts can lead investors to withdrawal of their money in 
the aftermath of the attack or it can become such a normal phenomenon, that it wouldn’t 
affect the investor sentiment as they get used to it and learn that the effect of the market 
drop doesn’t last long after the terrorist attack.  
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Most terrorism events occur in conflict countries, with very poor or non-existent 
democratic establishments, which leads to terrorism booming and becoming more of an 
everyday event (Global terrorism index 2017:14-20.) Europe and the United States have 
a low global terrorism index (GTI) score, meaning that they are rather safe countries to 
live in without everyday worry about possible terrorist acts. The score however, has been 
deteriorating significantly since the beginning of the 00’s when the score measurement 
started. For example, in 2002 there were 129 attacks in Europe and as a result only 
fourteen people died in these attacks, when in comparison with 2016 there were 630 
attacks (if Turkey is included) which led to 826 fatalities (GTI 2017:49.)  Worsened score 
of Europe on GTI scale is due to the fact, that deaths from terrorism have increased 
significantly since the beginning of 00’s, peaking in 2014 at over 4000 deaths a year.  
 
Since 1970 there have been different terrorist groups driving the statistics in OECD 
countries, in the early 70’s the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque Fatherland 
and Freedom (ETA) were responsible for most of the terrorist attacks. In the 80’s the peak 
was due to Air India flight 182 crashing. But after the 9/11 most of terrorist attacks came 
from the extremist group that goes by the name the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 
The group is at fault of increase in terrorism in the OECD countries after 2010. Terrorist 
group was able to execute few very deadly attacks, that shook the world and these terror 
acts do not aim at government or military, but civilians which creates fear and disruption 
more effectively. With the ISIS coming into picture, terrorism in the OECD countries has 
taken a completely different turn. Both IRA and ETA tried to target mostly military 
personnel, but there were incidents when also civilians got hurt unintentionally according 
to the groups. With ISIS the story is different, as the terrorist group wants to target the 
civilians, which in turn creates fear and could increase bad investor sentiment as investors 
fear that simply anyone could be a victim of their attack (GTI 2017: 60.)  
 
Because terrorism has been around as a documented event for decades, countries have 
increased investing into prevention of terrorism, especially countries with history of 
terrorism. In Global terrorism index from 2016 their research didn’t find relationship 
between number of terrorism attacks in the country and the success rate of terrorism 
prevention. There is however linkage between prevention rate and the type of terrorist 
attacks. Attacks that use explosives are prevented much more often, because they require 
higher amount of preparation and police is able to track for example when high quantities 
of ingredients needed for explosives are being bought in the country (GTI 2017: 55-56.) 
Therefore, the increasing intelligence in terrorism prevention could be an explanatory 
factor, if the investor sentiment has decreased. At the same time new types of attacks have 
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emerged, such as using automobiles for terrorism. These kinds of attacks are easy to 
arrange and carry out, and therefore they are very hard to prevent. However, increase of 
these type of attacks, small and quickly realizable, has forced countries to take preventive 
measures around mass events, such as closing off streets around event venues and placing 
bollards around that would stop vans driving on a high speed into crowds.   
 
 
2.3 The economic consequences of terrorism 
 
The economic costs of terrorism are a rather vague concept, as all effects of terrorism are 
not yet known or cannot be calculated effectively in every country. Most of the financial 
research concerning terrorism focus on how the financial markets react to the events. Few 
studies have however investigated how the terror attacks affect the economy.  The Global 
Terrorism Index calculates the effects as broadly as possible, but even the researchers say 
that the estimates of the figures are conservative, taking into account that the figures of 
terrorism account only for about one percent of the global cost of violence in 2016 (Global 
terrorism index 2017:82.) Calculation of the figures mostly comprises of estimation what 
human capital loss would have accounted for in GDP of the country, but there is no 
estimate of how much the loss of property caused by terrorism is in numbers(except for 
9/11 where the property loss has been calculated to be 65 US$ billions) (Global terrorism 
index 2017: 80; Prieto-Rodríguez, Rodríguez, Salas and Suarez-Pandiello 2009:812). In 
a study by Estrada, Park, Kim and Khan (2015) the model of terrorism impact on 
economy suggests that countries having a low GDP growth rate suffer from the attacks 
more, as economic leakage (cash flows reinvestment to safer countries) affects their 
performance and there are signs of prolonged effect on long term growth.  
 
Aligning with the broader studies of the political risk and events, terrorism has short and 
long-term effects on economy. Short term effects can be associated with the terror event 
right away, like loss of human capital and destruction of property. Zi and Sullivan (2017) 
link the calculation of costs of the short-term effects to the costs of repairing the damage 
and getting the infrastructure to its’ normal level of operation. The long-term effects arise 
from increase of negative investor sentiment. Part of the investor sentiment comprises of 
images, ideas and perceptions of the situations and political climate, it is hard to pin  
 21 
 
F
ig
u
re
 1
 T
er
ro
ri
st
 a
tt
ac
k
s 
u
se
d
 i
n
 t
h
e 
st
u
d
y
, 
m
o
d
el
le
d
 a
ro
u
n
d
 t
h
e 
M
S
C
I 
W
o
rl
d
 i
n
d
ex
. 
R
et
u
rn
 i
s 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 o
n
 s
ta
rt
in
g
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
t 
o
f 
1
0
0
. 
 22 
down when the flight for quality in assets, increasing cost of debt or asset pricing is due 
to terrorism or some other event or action. UK political risk index has declined in 2018 
(Marsh political risk map 2018), but is it due to terrorism events, especially Manchester, 
or is it due only to Brexit referendum that increases investors’ fear barometers concerning 
the future. Mostly the effects of terrorism are short term and the development of the 
economy depends on how the attacked country bears the consequences, developed 
countries tend to recoup from the terror attacks much quicker than developing countries 
(Llussa and Taveres 2011: 53, Eckstein and Tsiddon 2004).    
 
From 2012 the cost of terrorism has risen to a completely new level and reached its peak 
in 2014 when it amounted to 104 US$ billion, but since then the figure has been 
decreasing, totalling 84 US$ billion in 2016. Most of the economic impact comes from 
the loss of human capital. If the effect of 9/11 is deducted, then the total economic effect 
from year 2014 to 2016 is more than the total effect of preceding 12 years starting from 
2000. While terrorism has increased in the developed countries in the past decades, most 
of the economic impact of terrorism is stills suffered in the conflict countries that are 
mostly located in the Africa, South Asia and the Middle East (Global terrorism index 
2017).  But true costs and financial effects of terrorism are still not completely clear and 
the idea that they might be much higher than the Global Terrorism Index indicates calls 
for a more in depth research, if the terrorist attacks continue. 
 
 
2.4 Cyber terrorism 
 
Cyber terrorism is a recent threat in the world, that emerged only during the past 20 years, 
when the internet and information technology (IT) came to wide use of general public. 
Olaf Theiler describes that the attack of 9/11 changed the perception of cyber terrorism, 
in one event it was no longer abstract possibility discussed by IT – professionals but 
something very real and very dangerous to the world, breaking all the possible boundaries 
and rules. Theiler describes that “Cyber dimension might sooner or later be used for 
serious attacks with deadly consequences in the physical world” (2011).  
 
Cyber terrorism is even harder to define than classic terrorism, as it’s still unclear what 
cyber terrorism actually is and what is just cyber crime, such as environmental activism. 
While in conventional terrorism the use of explosives and firearms is more common than 
not, causing destruction of infrastructure and loss of human lives, things are different with 
cyber terrorism. The harshly simplified idea of terrorism is to cause fear and chaos, that 
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would hinder the normal operation of society as much as possible but digital attacks 
haven’t yet created such amounts of havoc and horror as terrorist may have hoped for. 
This however isn’t lasting, as cyber-attacks such as Stuxnet have proved.  
 
Stuxnet is a computer worm that appeared in 2010 and was used to disrupt Iranian nuclear 
enrichment by taking over the control of pumps, valves, generators and other industrial 
machines. (Lindsay 2013:365; Weinberger 2011:142). The attack was the first of its kind: 
extremely sophisticated, technologically complicated and precisely targeted. Stuxnet 
upgraded cyber-attacks from random, activism-type that wasn’t planned to cause any 
physical harm to “military-grade cyber missile” with the purpose of causing physical 
damage through cyber action (Lindsay 2013). In 2009 U.S president Barack Obama wrote 
that cyberthreats pose the highest-level challenges in the US not only from national 
security perspective, but also from economic perspective as well (New York Times 2009.) 
And while the danger of Stuxnet has passed as antiviruses against it have been created 
and the security loops it used have been patched, the highly intelligent code of Stuxnet is 
available for terrorists and other potential attackers to modify and develop for the future 
attacks (Weinberg 2011: 144). 
 
As our world becomes more and more connected to internet and important operations 
such as government operations and stock markets move their main operations to internet, 
many dangerous physical damages can be done which in turn affects investor sentiment 
and in worst case can hinder or stop market operations altogether. While digitalization 
has simplified our life in various ways, the same dependence that we now have on digital 
services is a threat. The threat for the financial world is enormous as money has gone 
from being physical paper to being just numbers on servers. Not only that, but completely 
digital currencies like Bitcoin have emerged, challenging old ways of thought. This 
change is however, very prone to possible disasters. Stuxnet opened door for extremely 
horrible possibilities, as like the attack on nuclear power plant was possible, so is the 
attack on financial markets, on stock markets that are now almost completely located in 
web. Should that happen, the reaction most likely would be disastrous, as the investors’ 
confidence in the system would drop and the flight from the markets could be of an 
unprecedented size and the length of the reaction could be completely different than as it 
is with conventional terrorism (Baranetsky 2009). 
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2.5 Terrorist events  
 
This study focuses on terrorism events that occurred between 1990 and 2017 in Europe 
and United States. Occurrence of the events modelled around MSCI World index could 
be examined in figure 1. During this time, there were three waves of terrorism, with less 
tragic years in between when measured by causalities. As can be seen from the figure 2, 
first wave begun around 9/11 terror attack, which was the most devastating attack of all 
times. Fatality reached a number of 2996 and number of wounded reaches over ten 
thousand people. First wave slowed down after 2004, when the second peak was reached 
with 804 fatalities and over 3000 non-fatal injuries. In 2004 there were 73 terror attacks 
in Europe and US in total, the most fatal happening on the 11th of March in Madrid, where 
four simultaneous train terrorist bombings took place.  
 
 
 
 
 
Second wave of attacks was milder than the one during the change of century. It peaked 
in 2011, when 257 fatalities and 694 non-fatal injuries occurred. The most devastating 
terror attack took place in 2011 in Utoya, Norway on the 22nd of July, when 69 people 
were killed and 60 wounded. Third wave started in 2014 and it was the most fatal year, if 
the attack of 9/11 is excluded from consideration. Behind the increase of fatalities caused 
by terrorism in 2014 is the Russian military intervention in Ukraine and most of the 
terrorist attacks in western countries occurred in Ukraine, but for the most part they were 
Figure 2 Visualisation of rate of fatal and non-fatal causalities caused by terrorism. On the right 
is the axis for the number of killed in the act and on the right is the axis for the wounded victims 
of the terror attacks. 
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attacks directed towards the military. The most fatal attack in 2014 was the crash of the 
Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 in Ukraine, in which 298 people died. No one took the 
credit for the crash of the airliner and it’s dubious if it indeed was a terror attack, therefore 
the attack is not included in the research of this thesis. In 2015 the military intervention 
in Ukraine continued, however there were also other serious terrorist attacks that could 
affect the mood of investors. On 13th of November in Paris group of assailants performed 
an attack using firearms, in which people died and 368 sustained non-fatal injuries.  
 
The figure 2 shows that there are three possible waves, where investor sentiment could 
turn negative, which in turn would lead to negative abnormal results. Based on several 
studies (Drakos 2010; Kollias, Manou, Papadamou and Stagiannis 2011; Estrada, Park, 
Kim and Khan (2015) the amount of casualties should be linked with the negative investor 
sentiment. But as Chen and Siems (2004), Kollias, Manou, Papadamou and Stagiannis 
(2011), Kolaric and Schiereck (2016) and Goel, Cagle and Shawky (2017) argued in their 
research there are evidence that investor sentiment isn’t as straightforward and although 
the fatalities in the events would  be high, the market could be still and show no reaction. 
Reasons for this could be a previous terrorist event that was close by to the event under 
consideration and the investors would already have corrected the market price 
accordingly with possible terror occurrence.   
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3. INVESTOR SENTIMENT 
 
This chapter presents the basic concepts of what the investor sentiment is, how it has been 
presented in the academic research and what methodologies are usually used when the 
investor sentiment is measured in order to capture the phenomenon. One important part 
of this chapter is to provide the reader with an understanding of whether the investor 
sentiment really plays a role in the stock prices, as the classic pricing models do not 
account for it. 
 
3.1 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis is at the core of modern finance theory and research. 
While it was already introduced in its infantile form in the beginning of the 20th century, 
the idea took off only in 1960’s when Eugene Fama popularized the theory. Eugene Fama 
states in the first sentences of his article that an “ideal is a market in which prices provide 
accurate signals for resource allocation: that is, a market in which firms can make 
production-investment decisions, and investors can choose among the securities that 
represent ownership of firms' activities under the assumption that security prices at any 
time "fully reflect" all available information” (1970: 383.) When these assumptions come 
together, and investors are rational, the markets could be called efficient. Rationality is 
reached when the decisions and beliefs of market operators rely simply put on Bayes’ 
theorem, which shortly described is a probability given to certain events; the probability 
is formed around the knowledge of factors that have affected the same type of events in 
the past. For example, in the case of terrorism, investor relaying on the Bayesian theorem 
would know, that it’s not the most common form of violence that occurs in western 
countries yearly, especially from the point of view of economy and that the effect of 
terrorism on the stock market is not lasting, if the investors had read academic researches 
about the topic. Another vital thing for investors is the understanding that markets do not 
offer “free lunches”, meaning that in order to get higher returns, one must bear higher 
risks. No strategies exist that provide excess return, without adding more risks of losing 
in same or even higher proportions according to the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(Barberis and Thaler 2002). But studies have shown that investors are sometimes able to 
avoid these constraints and earn excess return with different strategies, that do not 
increase their risk levels in the same proportions (De Long, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldmann 1990). 
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The Efficient Market Hypothesis (later abbreviated as “EMH”) doesn’t state straight 
forwardly that investors are rational, instead the markets are believed to be rational, as 
they reflect all available information on the market about the security. Efficiency also 
requires that there shouldn’t be any transactions or trading costs, all of the information 
should be available to the investors without costs, for example financial information of 
the companies should be freely available for all companies, and the last necessary 
condition is the agreement of what all the available information means for the current 
price and its’ possible development in the future (Fama 1970:387-388). But even Fama 
himself understood in his article that these rules are only theoretical and are hardly met 
in the real life, at least at the same time, but according to his words it doesn’t really matter 
as long as they occur at some scale (388).   
 
Event studies are based on Efficient Market Hypothesis and the reliance, that investors 
get the information about the event in question, evaluate and analyse the information 
correctly and are able to reflect their beliefs in market prices through their sentiment.  
 
Three different kinds of efficiency forms can be recognized by the way how information 
is reflected in the stock prices and how it can be processed from the stock market.  In the 
weak form of efficiency, the researchers are interested to test how well the history predicts 
the future. With the weak form of information prevailing, the only option of financial 
market analysis is technical analysis, where variables like interest rates and dividend yield 
can help in predicting returns (Fama 1991: 1576.) Semi-strong form of efficiency is tested 
with how information, that must be announced by the regulations and legislations, is 
reflected in the stock prices as soon as it’s released. This kind of information is for 
example: stock splits, earnings announcements, merger and acquisition announcement 
etc. The event study methodology assumes the semi-strong form, as its’ idea is to test 
how quickly the information released for public availability is reflected in the asset prices. 
The only way to beat the market in the semi-strong market form is by having insider 
information before anyone else, this is however a very risky path as misuse of insider 
information is illegal in all countries that have established financial markets. Third form 
is a strong form of market efficiency, under which no investor could be able to use any 
private information for own advantage as all of the prices are already reflected in the 
market prices. Under this form of market efficiency, the only option for the investors to 
gain the extra return is by accepting the higher risks that come with it (Fama 1970; Fama 
1991).  
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3.2 Investor sentiment theory 
 
In comparison with traditional rational theory that states that the value of a stock is a sum 
of the present value of the stock’s future cash flows, the traditional theory can’t explain 
why assets without known common principal risk are so significantly correlated with each 
other (Changsheng and Yongfeng 2012). In more recent studies existing irrationality in 
the markets has been recognized and studied and a few studies about relationship between 
irrational sentiment and price of risk have been made (Verma and Soydemir 2009: 1130).  
 
Investor sentiment, which also may be called a market sentiment, can be regarded as 
universal mood of the investors in prevailing market situation, towards expectation about 
financial assets. Investor sentiment is a mood that reflects investors idea in which 
direction the markets will be going in the future. When the investors are positive about 
the future of the economy and markets, it’s reflected in asset prices by rising asset prices, 
markets are then called bullish, the negative mood toward the economy makes the assets 
prices fall and the market situation is called bearish (Brown and Cliff 2004: 2; 
Chnagsheng and Yongfeng 2012:166).  
 
Investor sentiment plays a key role in the event study methodology, as it can be seen as a 
driver in the market adjustments to the event news. Do the investors see the news as 
negative or positive? Do they consider that the news will bring positive return to the 
company in the future, or do they view that the choice made by the company is irrational 
and will decrease its value? Event studies that measure investor sentiment try to find the 
answer to all of these questions.  
 
In research about the investor sentiment connection to the EMH, researches have divided 
the investor sentiment to two explanatory parts: rational (arbitrageurs) and irrational, that 
can also be called noise-trading because they are irrational and make their investment 
decisions based on impulses and surrounding gossips rather than on rational Bayesian 
theorem (De Long at al. 1990). In order for the EMH to be fulfilled, the following pattern 
between the two types of investors should occur. When the irrational traders are bullish, 
the rational traders should be bearish and vice versa. This would offset any kind of 
irrational pricing effect, and the stock would only reflect the present value of the future 
cash flows (Verma and Soydemir 2009; Changsheng and Yongfeng 2012).  
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But does it really go that way in real life? De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann 
(1990) examine the noise traders in their study and especially focus on whether the noise 
traders could affect the stock prices despite Fama stating otherwise and also whether the 
rational arbitrageurs really tend to engage in the offsetting trading. They analyse that for 
the rational arbitrageurs to start the offsetting trading against the noise traders, they would 
need to go against their willingness to take risks, as the arbitrageurs wouldn’t know for 
how long the bullish or bearish phase of noise traders would be prevailing. In other words, 
the deceitful optimism of the noise traders could keep on going for the longer period than 
arbitrageurs would calculate, leading to great losses for the arbitrageurs. And like De 
Long et al. point out, this would lead to noise traders getting much higher expected returns 
than rational arbitrageurs.  
 
Investors can be categorized in other ways than rational and irrational, as it would 
simplify the complex species that humans are. According to Bethke, Gehde-Trapp and 
Kempf (2017) there are investors that have sentiment that differs from average, for 
example investors with normally bad sentiment react more strongly to unfavourable news 
than investors with usually normal sentiment. To the same conclusion come Affuso and 
Lahtinen (2018) in their study of Twitter tweets. Their study documents that negative 
tweets caused more reaction in the stock market than the positive ones and same can be 
applied the other way around. Bethke et al. studies how investor sentiment affects bond 
correlation. Their study finds very significant evidence that investor sentiment affects the 
bond correlation through risk correlation, in bad sentiment scenarios the negative bond 
correlation is high, especially in case of low rated bonds (2017).  
 
Academic research on investor sentiment has noted that investors tend to overreact or 
underreact when it comes to events or news that according to Efficient Market Hypothesis 
require a rational and well-constructed reaction (Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 1998; 
Baker, Wurgler and Yuan 2012). In a short period of time (lasting under a year) the 
investors tend to react to the news slowly, leading to underreaction but if the pattern of 
the news continues for a longer period of time, investors tend to overreact to the news 
(Barberis et al. 1998: 307-308). To the same conclusion comes Blau (2017) who showed 
that investors with high sentiment tend to load on positively skewed stocks in the period 
of high sentiment and they were overly optimistic about the probabilities of the future 
returns in these cases, which leads to underperformance in the stocks that are positively 
skewed.  
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Barberis, Shleifer and Vishney suggest that investors that are familiar with this behaviour 
could take advantage of it and aspire for the abnormal returns, against the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis assumptions, that imply that all the information is reflected in price 
that are corrected by the investors analysis, in other words investor sentiment.  
 
3.2.1 Capturing the investor sentiment 
 
Good part of the financial theory relies on rationality, factors that can be controlled and 
measured. The famous Capital Asset Pricing Model doesn’t take the sentiment into 
account, as it shouldn’t be accountable according to the EMH. But something is always 
left unexplained in the models, and that is reflected in the idiosyncratic volatility of the 
asset pricing models. Aabo, Pantzalis and Park (2017) test if the idiosyncratic volatility 
in the asset pricing models is indeed the sign of the noise trading in the market and their 
results suggest, that there is significant sign of noise trading reflected in the idiosyncratic 
volatilities.  
 
Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) study momentum investing strategy and how 
their results could be explained by the investor sentiment. In their study they note that 
stocks that had high past returns and got a positive return announcement tend to perform 
better than companies with negative past returns and negative announcements, 
concluding that investors tend to incorporate new information into the asset prices slowly, 
which is against the efficient market hypothesis, that relies in its semi-strong form on 
immediate reaction from investors when the news or announcements reach them. 
However, in his article Fama (1970) says that overreactions and underreactions should 
cancel each other out, at least in the long run.  
 
As investor sentiment is seen to be captured in the movements of the financial markets 
there are numerous ways it has been measured with. The problem is choosing the correct 
methodology in order to capture only the investor sentiment, as the market movements 
can contain “non-sentiment-related idiosyncratic variation” (Baker at al. 2012: 273).  
Options are an efficient tool in measuring investor sentiment, as they are used as tools to 
hedge the risk of unexpected and unwanted asset price movements of assets like stocks, 
commodity prices, exchange rates etc. Option prices reflect the information of the 
investors view of asset price in the future, and therefore are good tools to look at their 
outlook on the future. The most convenient and easiest way of measuring investor 
sentiment is by applying the event study methodology and seeing how investors react to 
the news announcements of different kinds. Abnormal returns are used for this validation, 
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as they show the difference between what was the reaction to the event (closing price of 
the event window) compared to the expected return of the asset. It shows how well the 
investors adapt to the new information and what are their forecasts for the future in light 
of the new information.  
 
Baker at al. (2012) point out also a few other ways of measuring investor sentiment. 
Simple way to look at the sentiment is by using the market turnover. They have an 
overview of a vast amount of literature where the main point is that investors with a high 
sentiment are inclined to trade more, which drives the volumes up (275). They also 
examine if the contagion is a key driver in sentiment and their research suggest that both 
local and international sentiment play a role in predicting the “high sentiment-beta 
portfolios such as those including high volatility stocks or stocks of small distressed and 
growth companies” (286).   
 
This thesis focuses on a classic way of measuring investor sentiment, that has been used 
in many studies focusing on terrorism, i.e. the abnormal returns of the event days.  
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4. PRIOR EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
This chapter’s focus is on providing a brief overview of significant academic research 
that has studied the effects on terrorism on financial markets. Some explanatory studies 
that offer explanation to the investors reaction to terrorism are also reviewed.  
 
The terrorism incident that happened on 9th of September 2001 in New York started the 
flood of financial research on what effects terrorism has on the financial world. The 
academic researchers are debating on whether terrorism has an impact on asset markets. 
The most common conclusion is that there is an impact, but it’s short-lived. Eventually 
news stop, people move on, life goes on and asset markets return to their pre-terrorism 
attack levels. 
 
 
4.1 Terrorism effect on financial markets 
 
One of the key studies in terrorism was done by Drakos (2010) in which he focuses on a 
large number of terrorist attacks instead of just 9/11, in order to measure the 
comprehensive effect of terrorism on stock markets from 1994 to 2004. The results of his 
study show a significant suggestion, that terrorism indeed effects the investors’ mood by 
showing up as a negative stock returns on the terror event day. According to Drakos, the 
higher psychological impact (more fatalities) increases the investor sentiment in a 
negative way, leading to a significantly lower returns during the event days. 
 
Study by Nikkinen and Vähämaa (2010) focused on examining how terrorism affects 
stock market sentiment during terrorist attacks. Their study focus solely on the FTSE 100 
index and they used option implied probability density functions. They find that after the 
terrorist event the expected value of the index drops and that markets suffer from 
uncertainty for some time, although it’s not long-lasting. Descriptive statistic in their 
study of three major terrorism events show increase in kurtosis with every terrorist attack 
despite 9/11 being the most severe attack of the three. High value of kurtosis, in other 
words fat tails of implied probability densities after the terrorist attacks explains that 
investors’ expectation of future extreme changes in the index increases, meaning that 
investors expect more terrorist attacks which will affect the index (268-269). Their study 
also shows how long it took for markets to rebound after each of the three attacks. Their 
study showed that despite all of the three being a major terrorism attacks, it took less time 
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for markets to rebound after July 7, 2005 terrorism attack than after September 11, 2001 
and March 11, 2004 terrorist attack.  
 
Study by Nikkinen, Omran, Sahlström and Aijö (2008) focuses only on the attack of 
September 11, with a one-year examination period. Purpose of the study is to determine 
terrorist attack’s effects on stock returns and volatility. They focus on recording how 
indices from 53 different countries reacted to the 9/11 attack. The empirical results of the 
study show that not all regions respond to the attack in the same magnitude and results 
can be explained by the markets’ levels of integration with the international markets. 
Their study provide support to previous studies by showing that European markets’ 
reactions are much more sensitive to US market fluctuations and some Asian markets 
also. The study records that these markets exhibit more volatile behaviour, making them 
more prone to react jointly to unexpected events such as terrorism.   
 
Study by Chesney, Reshetar and Karaman (2011) in which they observe 77 terror attacks 
from 25 countries over a time period from 1994 to 2005. The purpose of their study is to 
examine what kind of impact terrorism has on stock markets, but also how it affects bonds 
and commodities. Their study uses a comparison of different methodologies that try to 
capture the effects of terrorism on financial markets and their conclusion is that non-
parametric methodologies have a best performance out of all. Their study documents that 
out of 77 terrorist attacks around the world, the Swiss markets were the most vulnerable 
to experience negative impact and in contrast the U.S. markets were the least affected by 
the number of terrorist attacks. Also, airline and insurance industries experienced the 
worst drops, while the banking sector experienced the least downfall in sector 
comparison. They also document significant results on both bond and commodity markets 
when testing the effects of terrorism.  
 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) study the effect of terrorism on the world economy as a 
part of endogenous growth model. The results of their model show that if the investors 
are free to move their assets and can easily diversify their portfolios and risks, there 
should be large movements of capital between the countries. Results of their regressions 
support their model and their estimation is that increase in the standard deviation of 
intensity of terrorism by one deviation results in a 5% fall in the net FDI position of the 
country.  
 
In the past two decades terrorist attacks in the developed western countries have changed. 
In 70’s and 80’s terrorism was mostly from domestic terrorist groups, like Irish 
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Republican Army and Basque Homeland and Liberty, claiming to fight for freedom. In 
past few decades however, terrorism in western countries has become more international, 
meaning that terrorists are more often than not from other ethnic backgrounds than 
majority of the people in the attack country. Kumar and Liu (2013) study if a spillover 
effect could be detected in the stock markets during the terrorism events. Motivation for 
the study is now not only global but highly interconnected infrastructure between the 
countries. Through internet news can reach most parts of the world within minutes, 
meaning that the fear and chaos could spread as fast. Their study focuses on time period 
from 1990 to 2010 with large coverage of countries. Results of their event study suggest, 
that there is a significant spillover effect between the financial markets of different 
countries, but only between countries that have an active trading relationship between 
each other. Financial markets of countries that don’t have prominent trading partnership 
with country experiencing terror attack are not contaminated with bad investor sentiment.  
 
 
4.2 Studies with mixed results 
 
Because most of the studies focused on multiple terror events, there are studies that 
observed contradicting results, as not all events were equally significant. There were 
numerous explanations to these results.  
 
Arin, Ciferri and Spagnolo (2008) study the effect of terrorism in six different markets: 
Indonesia, Israel, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and UK from 2002 to 2006. They use a time-
series framework and develope a daily terror index that they used in the bivariate VAR-
GARCH(1,1) calculations. The results of their study show statistically significant effects 
in both mean and variance regarding the causality effects. However, their study also noted 
that investors in the European stock markets don’t show as much reactions to the terror 
actions as do investors in developing countries’ markets. This can be a sign of a higher 
trust in the governments’ counteraction strategies. Arif and Suleman (2017) used a 
normalized cointegration vectors to study terrorist attacks that occurred in Pakistan during 
the time period of 2002 to 2011. Their study reports significant negative results on overall 
markets. Their study also focuses on recording how different market sectors react to 
terrorism: the study shows that oil and gas industries have a negative reaction but 
financial, consumer, tobacco and healthcare industries exhibit a statistically significant 
positive relationship. They do not find any explanatory evidence for this behaviour other 
than a need for insurance grows when the probabilities of terrorism occurrences increase.  
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One important thing that researches want to capture in the event studies, is the longevity 
of the effects on the markets, for example how fast markets returned to their pre-terrorism 
state after the attack. Nikkinen and Vähämää (2010) note that the markets rebound to their 
normal state very quickly (2010), the longest rebound period was experienced after the 
attack of 9/11. Goel, Cagle and Shawky (2017) focus in their study on capturing how 
vulnerable the financial markets are to terrorism, in other words, how fast do they rebound 
to their normal state. Their time period starts from 1991 and last to 2010 and they focus 
only on major events in terms of damage. The results of their study are contradicting with 
the commonly held opinion about the terrorist attacks effect on financial markets. They 
are not able to find a pattern in abnormal returns, as there are both negative and positive 
market reactions on the day of the terror events. They argue that when the negative returns 
occur, the moving power behind them is often something else than terrorism. Exception 
is the attack of 9/11 which was a case of extremity, as the size and proportion of the attack 
was never experienced before. Goel et al argue that the fact that investors have grown 
numb to terrorism explains the lack of significant negative returns.  
 
Kollias, Manou, Papadamou and Stagiannis (2011) want to document if the investors’ 
reaction is significant and what kind of factors are its’ major drivers. Their research 
focuses on London’s and Athens’ stock markets from year 1990 to 2009. They don’t 
detect patterns in the investors’ sentiment reaction to the terrorist attacks and therefore 
aren’t able to report if the markets reactions had changed towards the events. Their study 
points out that Athens stock markets are much more sensitive to terrorism than London’s 
markets, and they argue this could be due to smaller capitalisation of the Athens markets. 
By observing attacks individually with the focus on their individual characteristics 
Kollias et al. suggest that factors that could affect the proportions of the investors reaction 
to the attacks could be size, maturity and many other individual factors of the attacks, 
such as type of attack (bombing, plane explosion, truck drive through etc). To the same 
conclusion come also Estrada, Park, Kim and Khan (2015) who study the effects of 
terrorism on economy. They suggest that size and intensity of the attack have a high 
significance to the economic consequences. Based on this evidence there shouldn’t be 
difference whether the attacks of the same magnitude occurred in the late 90’s or in 2017.  
 
Kolaric and Schiereck (2016) study the effect of two terror attacks, the attack in Paris on 
November 13th 2015 and in Brussels on March 22nd  2016. Unlike most studies, they focus 
only on one industry of stock markets: airlines. Their empirical findings show significant 
negative market reactions in a one-day event window frame, but an event window up to 
5 days doesn’t show any significant reaction from the markets. However, their results 
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show that investors reaction towards the Paris attack is much stronger than towards the 
Brussels attack that occurred only 4 months after the attack in Paris. Kolaric and 
Schiereck analyse these results as efficient market reaction and in the case of Brussels 
they suggested that the prices of airline stocks are adjusted by the investors from the 
attack in Paris to include the risk of terrorism.  
 
Most of the studies focus on terrorist attacks that occurred in the 21st century, but there 
were numerous attacks before that and several studies focus on examining some of them. 
Chen and Siems (2004) focus in their study on 14 terrorist/military attacks starting from 
the 1915 and the most recent one being attack of 9/11. Results of the study that focuses 
on U.S. capital markets show that markets have grown flexible to the unexpected negative 
events as the recovery from the dip to the pre-terrorist attack state happens in much 
shorter period of time. For example, it took the U.S stock market 795 days to rebound 
(i.e. to return to the pre-attack state) from the invasion of France on May 12th of 1940, 
232 days to rebound from Pearl Harbour attack on December 7th, 1941 and 40 days after 
9/11. The abnormal returns of the older events are much more significant than of the more 
recent events. Chen and Siems explain this by the quick advancement of technology that 
has led to more efficient data acquirement, as also more flexible and well managed 
monetary and fiscal policies and antiterrorism countermeasures give the investors higher 
sense of safety, so they don’t act on the negative news as dramatically as before.  
 
Finally, media coverage plays a significant role in investor sentiment. Study by Melnick 
and Eldor (2010) tries to explain how the terrorism affects economy and what role media 
plays in it, or how much exactly does the media affect the sentiment of investors. Study 
brings to light the fact that terrorists use media for their own purpose, to spread fear, 
panic, trepidation and mistrust in the government and through that mistrust in the safety 
of infrastructures Their study is in contradiction with study by Estrada et al. (2015) who 
suggest that the magnitude and severity of the attack affects the investor sentiment. 
Melnick and Eldor’s study suggests that in fact the amount and way how media covers 
the attack affects the investor sentiment and through that the stock market. It’s not about 
what you say, but how you say it. Publishing gruesome pictures on the front page of a 
daily newspaper will most likely affect the mind of people more, than short article 
comprising of facts and numbers, no matter how shocking they might be.  
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Despite some studies not getting as significant results as others, it is an undeniable fact 
that terrorism affects the investor sentiment. The question is how much and has the effect 
deflated over time. 
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter focuses on presenting the hypothesis and methodology of the empirical study 
and explains how it was performed in detail. The chapter is divided as following: first 
subchapter presents the hypothesis that is tested in this thesis, second chapter focuses on 
describing the data indices and event dates used in the study, data sources from which 
they were acquired, and the filtering principles of the events selected for the study. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in this part in order to understand the data in a 
statistical way. Third part of this chapter focuses on presenting in detail the event study 
methodologies that were performed in the empirical part of the study.  
 
 
5.1 Research hypothesis 
 
This thesis aims to study whether investors have grown numb to terrorist attacks over the 
time frame of two decades. The idea is to take a look at several terror attacks in the 
western developed countries, in order to distinguish whether the investors have been 
rational in their pricing of the stocks.  
 
𝐻1: Investor sentiments towards the terrorist attacks has decreased, which in turn has 
led to a milder reaction in stock prices during the terrorist attacks. 𝐻1: = 0 
 
𝐻0: Investor sentiment hasn’t been affected, and their negative reaction to terrorism acts 
persists and is reflected in the stock prices. 
 
 
5.2 Data description  
 
Terrorism incident data was retrieved from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which 
is moderated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START); a Department of Homeland Security Centre of Excellence led by 
the University of Maryland. At the moment the GTD dataset is the most extensive, 
including many types of terrorist events from all over the world. GTI index is composed 
of over 180 000 terrorist events, which were filtered to fit this thesis according to several 
principles. GTI index had events starting from the 1970’s, but 1970’s and 1980’s events 
were filtered out from this study, because the stock markets were extremely volatile in 
the years before 1990’s, which can bias the results of event study. Second filtration 
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principle was that, only terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States of America, 
Western and Eastern Europe were taken into account (excluding Turkey and Israel). Third 
filtration principle was that terrorist attacks in which military was a targeted group were 
not included, as they are less covered in media and therefore aren’t available for investors 
analysis at the time of the attack. Military bases are usually also placed outside the civil 
population, which in turn doesn’t affect the economy in a same way that the attacks 
towards the populated infrastructures do and therefore don’t cause the expected market 
fluctuations. Fourth filtration principle was that only the events that are know for certain 
to be terrorist attacks are taken into examination. Taken these principles into account, the 
total amount of terrorist events, that was analysed in this study, is 40.  See the appendix 
1 for the detailed description of the terrorist events.  
 
For the measurement of the effect of the attacks, several indices were used. For the events 
that occurred in Europe or Russia, European market indices such as FTSE 100, Euro 
Stoxx 50 and MSCI World were used. Events that occurred in the U.S. were studied using 
the S&P 500 index. Index S&P 500 represents the most used index from the United States 
as it gives good representation of 500 most valuable companies measured by market 
capitalization, and the companies represented in the index make up a total of 80% of the 
all US market capitalization. Euro Stoxx 50 consists of fifty blue chip companies from 
eleven Eurozone countries, making it a good representative of very liquid European 
stocks and this is a must-have criterion in capturing investor sentiment. MSCI Europe 
represents 400 large and mid-cap companies from fifteen developed European markets 
and is a bit larger representative of the European markets. IT was chosen based on the 
fact that some terror events occurred in countries that other European indices do not 
cover.  Also, the MSCI World index was used to test the abnormal returns of all terrorist 
events. The MSCI World index consists of 1634 large and mid-cap companies from 23 
developed markets. It comprises of stocks from eleven industries and the companies that 
are chosen from each country should make for about 85% of the free float-adjusted market 
capitalization in each country. Therefore, using the MSCI World index for observing the 
investors reaction to terror events is also justified, especially for the terrorist event of 
September 11, as S&P 500 was closed for a week after the event day.   
 
The time period of the data is from December 1994 to January 2018 and consists of daily 
returns. All terror events were matched with the corresponding indices that reflect their 
markets in some way, Russia being the only exception. In order to measure the abnormal 
returns produced by the terrorist attacks in Russia, MSCI Europe index was used. Leaning 
on the study of Kumar and Liu (2013) it is presumed that a spillover effect could occur 
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between the countries, therefore European investors might also be eager to invest in 
neighbouring countries’ stock markets, thus several European indices are used for 
measuring the effect of European terrorist attacks. Index S&P 500 was used in capturing 
abnormal returns of terrorist events that occurred in United States.  
 
If the terrorist event occurred on the trading day, that trading day’s closing price was 
used. However, if the event occurred during the weekend or bank holiday, when stock 
markets were closed, the next available closing price was used (for example Monday 
closing price). In the case of the 9/11 attack, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
Nasdaq (both trade stocks included on the S&P 500 index) were closed for almost a week 
and reopened on 17th of September. Therefore, the closing price of 17th of September was 
used in the event study of the 9/11 attack when calculating the abnormal returns of S&P 
500, but with MSCI World the original attack day (9th of September) was used. In total 
five event dates were moved forward, and the dates of these events can be seen from table 
1.  
 
 
The daily prices of the Euro Stoxx 50, FTSE 100, MSCI Europe, MSCI World and S&P 
500 were obtained from the Datastream database. Data was edited using MS Office Excel 
and STATA-software was used to perform the event study and statistical regressions.   
 
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
The two tables below describe the normal log transformed data that is used to perform 
the econometric study in this thesis. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of S&P 500, 
FTSE 100, EuroStoxx50, MSCI Europe and MSCI World indices for the entire time 
Table 1 Shifts of terror event dates in the stock data. The terror attack of September 11th 
2001 shut down the S&P 500 and the stock markets opened in New York only on 17th of 
September. All other events occurred during the weekends, when the market was closed. 
 
Table 2 Shifts of terror event dates in the stock data. The terror attack of September 11th 
2001 shut down the S&P 500 and the stock markets opened in New York only on 17th of 
September. All other events occured during the weekends, when the market was closed. 
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period from the beginning of the 1995 until the end of the 2017. The mean daily returns 
are positive for all indices with modest returns of 0.02% for four indices out of five. 
Highest return was observed in the S&P 500 index and all other indices also got 
impressive daily returns at some point. MSCI Europe experienced lowest returns of -
10.18%.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of every terrorist event that is studied in this thesis 
from MSCI World index’s natural log transformed returns. Days that were used to get 
descriptive statistics are the days of estimation window and event window jointly, 
resulting in the 122 daily observations. The MSCI World index is chosen for this 
observation, because it’s the only index that examines every terrorist event chosen for 
this study, as other indices are used only in connection with the origin of the terrorist 
event.  The normal log transformed returns during the whole event window can give a 
hint of the prevailing situation of the market around the events. For example, the 
descriptive statistics around the terror attack of September 11th, 2001 tell that the market 
was sloping down, as the mean return was -0.09% and median return -0.11% and the 
smallest return was -2.5%. When compared with the return, -1.5% on the attack day (t = 
0) and -0.46% on the next day (t = 1), it’s clear that the market was rather negative before 
the event, which can affect the significance of the abnormal returns. While the skewness 
and kurtosis of the events timeframe observation are not zero, the figures are not extreme. 
While skewness is for the most part close to 0, indicating that the tails of the distribution 
are close to normal distribution and the kurtosis indicates that the centrum of the normal 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the whole data sample of returns ranging from 1995 to 2017 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics for the whole data sample of returns ranging from 1995 to 2017 
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distribution is steeper than in the ideal situation. During the 122 trading days the mean 
has remained low, for the most part with positive daily returns around 0.10%. 
 
When comparing the overall time frame observations of the indices to event specific 
observations, we can ultimately say that even if there were negative or positive reactions 
from investors during the terrorist events, they weren’t the most dramatic reactions that 
indices have experienced in the one day.  
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics for individual terror attacks using MSCI World index. 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics for individual terror attacks using MSCI World index. 
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MSCI World’s most negative one day return over the time frame of 1995 to 2017 was 
 -7.33% and the most negative return in the time frame of the events was -5.03% for 14th 
and 22nd of July 2016 terror attacks, and these negative returns didn’t occur on the terror 
event days.  
 
 
5.3 Event study methodology 
 
Event studies focus on events that are specifically chosen for research purposes in order 
to identify if those events have affected for example financial markets. The events could 
either have positive or negative effects, as the information of the event should be reflected 
in the markets and the main requirement of the event studies is that the markets are 
efficient, otherwise the effect of the event would be biased. In this study the methodology 
of abnormal returns is used to test the effect of terrorist events on investor sensitivity. 
Negative abnormal returns appear as a result of an unwanted event with negative 
consequences, such as terrorist attack. Positive abnormal returns are a sign of positive 
news and positive development, such as an announcement of huge order for 
manufacturing company or other news that could affect companies’ results in positive 
ways possibly for several years.  
 
Abnormal return is usually measured for individual stocks or portfolios, but when used 
with indices it tells the picture of a whole market reaction to the event, as usually terrorism 
(except environmental terrorism, that takes an individual target) doesn’t target one 
specific company, but rather the goal is to cause as much distress and destruction as 
possible, so the normal operations of the country would be hindered.      
 
The methodology used in this study is the same that was used by many researches, but 
from the articles that were mentioned in the literature review the research of Chen and 
Siems (2004) is the closest one. They based their empirical study on classical 
methodology paper by Brown and Warner (1985). The idea of abnormal return testing is 
finding statistically significant deviation from the expected returns or past averages in 
this case. The results of abnormal returns during the event must be significant in order to 
be classified as affecting investor sentiment, otherwise they can be interpreted as 
insignificant from the investor point of view.  
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Abnormal return of the event is calculated from the event days. Some events, like 
terrorism, are unexpected and therefore there is usually no need to time the event window 
beforehand, but for example earning announcements are usually expected events and 
possible news leakages should be accounted for, therefore event windows are extended 
few days before the event day itself, to account for possible early investor sentiment. 
Event day returns are compared to the market’s expected returns, that can be calculated 
using average returns of the event’s estimation window. There is not any universal length 
for the estimation window, which can be a reason why different event studies that rely on 
the abnormal return methodology get different abnormal returns for the same events. 
Abnormal returns can be either positive or negative, but terrorist events carry always a 
negative information and that should show up as a decrease in market prices around the 
event.  
 
For the calculation of the abnormal returns the date of the event is t = 0 and the estimation 
period ranging between t = -120 and t = -10 is used in determining the normal behaviour, 
or in other words the expected return of the financial market for the period. As the terrorist 
events are unexpected the event window is t = 0 and t = +1. In case the event occurred 
after the markets were already closed for the day, the effect of the trading would only be 
visible in the markets on the next day of the terrorist event. The longer event window of 
t =0 to t = +5 is also tested, to see if the market reaction got stronger.  
 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the equation 1, 
 
(1)                                                        𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖 −  ?̅?𝑖𝑡 
 
where:  
𝑅𝑖 = return of the index on the day in the event window 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 = simple average returns of the same index as in the estimation window,  
here t= -10 to -120, as in equation 3.  
 
Daily return 𝑅𝑖 is defined as in equation 2 
 
(2)                                                        𝑅𝑖 = ln(
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡−1
) 
 
where:  
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡 = is the stock index i return at time t 
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(3)       
                 ?̅?𝑖𝑡 =  
1
111
 ∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑡
−10
𝑡=−120
 
where:  
 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = is the one-day return of an index during the estimation period.  
 
 
In order to test the abnormal returns for the significance, cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) is calculated like is shown in equation 4, this equation is used to test the two-day 
abnormal returns.  
 
 
 (4) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1+1
 
 
For the significance testing, the t-statistics is performed according to the equation 5  
 
(5)                                                        𝑡𝑠 =
?̅?−𝑚0
?̂? √𝑛⁄
 
where:  
 
?̅? = either the AR or CAR to be tested for significance  
𝑚0=  the hypothesized value, in this study 0 
?̂? =the standard deviation of the average abnormal returns  
n = is the sample size, in this case the amount of returns in the event window 
 
 
5.4 Explanatory regression for the Abnormal returns 
 
To understand the results of the event study presented above, explanatory regression of 
the abnormal returns is applied for testing the explanatory variables.   
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Because terrorism events do not always occur during the trading hours and in the same 
time zone, the two-day event window is used to study the difference. The two-day CAR 
is used as a base in the explanatory regression as the dependent variable. The CAR is 
calculated as presented in the previous subchapter.  
 
The regression that was applied to study the effects is as presented in the equation 6 and 
7. 
 
(6)                𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀 
 
(7)                𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀 
 
Where the independent variables are: 
  
Country, variable that tells the country of terrorist event occurrence. The data is 
acquired from the Global Terrorism Database. The countries of the terrorist attack 
can be viewed in the terrorist event description in the Appendix 1.  
Killed, is a control variable that tells how many people died in the terror attack. 
Data is acquired from the Global Terrorism Database, the description of the 
amount of numbers of victims can be viewed from the Appendix 1. 
Wounded, is a control variable that tells how many people were wounded in the 
terror attack. Detailed figures can be viewed from the Appendix1.   
Year, variable stands for the year when the terror attack occurred.  
 
Variables Wounded and Killed are decided to regress separately in their own regressions, 
as they had extremely high variance inflation factor (VIF) between them, affecting at the 
same time the other variables of regression.  
 
(8)           𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 
 
(9)           𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀 
 
The equations 8 and 9 differs from the equations 6 and 7 only in how the independent 
variable Year is treated. The purpose of the equations 8 and 9 is to perform additional 
regressions with the control for the year effect in order to capture if the numbing effect 
of terrorism could be captured through years.  
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In addition to the additional testing of equations 8 and 9, the effects of individual countries 
are tested by appointing to each country own dummy variable. In the regression models 
10 and 11 the same principles apply as in models 6,7,8 and 9. Variables Killed and 
Wounded are regressed separately as is the dummy variable for the early years in the 
period.  
 
(10) 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 /  𝑊𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦2 +
𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦3 … + ⋯ + 𝜀 
 
(11)  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 /  𝑊𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦1 +
𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦2 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦3 … + ⋯ + 𝜀 
 
After applying the additional regressions presented above, additional explanatory 
variables are tested like presented in equations 12 and 13 in order to test if the possible 
explanatory factors presented by Estrada, Park, Kim and Khan (2015) and Kollias et al 
(2011). Additional explanatory independent variables are  
 
(12)    𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 /  𝑊𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟/𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +
𝛽3𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 + 𝜀 
 
(13)    𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑/ 𝑊𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟/ 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +
𝛽3𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑢𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑚𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠 +
𝛽7𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽8𝑅𝐼𝑅𝐴 + 𝜀 
 
Target = target of the terrorist attack. Data retrieved from the Global Terrorism 
Database and is included in Appendix 1. 
Type = type of the terror attack, most of the attacks were bombings or explosions.  
Attacker = Attackers were separated in their own group.  
Attacker Dummies = Attackers were studied more closely by attacker dummies, 
where each type of the attacker got a value of 1 when the attack was done by the 
group in question and 0 otherwise.  
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
This chapter presents the empirical results and findings that were obtained with the 
statistical methodologies presented in the previous chapter. Firstly, abnormal return 
results of the event study will be presented of each terrorist event. After that, abnormal 
returns are regressed with multiple explanatory and control variables in order to capture 
if these variables could have acted as explanatory drivers in investor sentiment.  
 
 
6.1 Cumulative abnormal returns  
 
The results of the event study are presented in tables 4 and 5, by showing the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) of the two-day event window, t = 0 and t = 1.  In the tables the 
two-day CAR returns are presented alongside the t-statistics of returns. The statistically 
significant events are bolded, and the significance stars are positioned next to values of 
the t-statistics. Seventeen events with negative returns were statistically significant from 
the forty events, and five of these were extremely significant. In addition to this, some 
events experienced positive returns that were statistically significant. This is a suggestion 
that investor sentiment is easily affected by terrorist events, but unlike it was believed, 
effect is not always negative. The positive reactions can also suggest that not all terrorist 
acts affect the sentiment as much as some.   
 
6.1.1 Early years results 
 
The first twenty terrorist attack events from the event selection that this study observes 
are presented in table 4. Events in table 4 start from 1995 and span to 2010. During this 
time period eight events with negative CARs were significant, two were at 1% 
significance level and six at a 5% level. The two attacks that were significant at the 1% 
level occurred on 13th of September 1999 in Russia where Chechen rebels bombed an 
apartment building causing the death of 118 civilians and the other one occurred on 21st 
of August 2006 in Moscow Russia, where a bomb was detonated on a public market place 
resulting in a death of 10 people. While it’s believed that the attack was motivated by race 
and was performed by Muslim extremists, no terrorist groups admitted the responsibility 
for the attack.   
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The attack of 11th of September 2001 was significant at 5% level in both S&P 500 and 
MSCI World indices. It’s important to note, that the CAR return for the event 9/11 in 
S&P 500 was calculated from 17th and 18th of September, as the stock markets were 
closed in New York for a week after the attack. This is a significant factor, as no other 
attacks caused a market shutdown and after seven days of the attacks all markets had 
recovered from the attacks, only the 9/11 was an exception to this as the effects lasted up 
to 40 days (Nikkinen and Vähämaa 2010). These results are in line with the wide 
documentation in other studies.  
 
From twenty events, eight had significantly positive returns. Some of the events resulted 
in large fatal losses of human lives, like for example the 1st of September 2004 in Beslan, 
Russia when Chechen terrorist attacked a school resulting in death of 344 people many 
of whom were children. These results suggest an inconsistent and irrational reaction from 
the investors. The question of the origin of the attack arises, does the origin of the attack 
matters? The two most significant events in the first-time period occurred in Russia, 
therefore the origin of Beslan attack can’t be regarded as explanatory factor for the 
positive returns. However, many factors affect the daily mood of investors in the case of 
positive returns on the days of terrorist attack, there are countless possibilities of what 
could have affected the minds of investors. Some documented examples could be for 
example the January effect, that could drive the greed for higher returns more than fear 
for the future. 
 
 
6.2 Results from 2011-2017 
 
Returns and t-statistics for the terror events that occurred from 2011 up until the end of 
2017 are presented in table 5. From twenty terrorist attack events presented here, nine are 
statistically significant, meaning that investors reacted more negatively than before in 
more current time period. Especially the significance of the events was higher, six events 
were significant at the 1% level compared to two in the period of 1995 to 2010. The 
significance of the negative cumulative abnormal returns increases notably towards the 
more recent attacks and the reaction of the markets to the terrorist attacks is more coherent 
than in the first-time period. As can be seen from the table 5, if there is a significant 
reaction it usually showed up in all indices that were chosen for the examination of the 
terrorist events.  
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The most significant events were the most recent ones that occurred on 3rd of June 2017 
in United Kingdom and 17th of August 2017 in Spain. Both attacks were performed in the 
same way, the terrorists driving a van into crowds. The number of fatalities remained 
under twenty, this result seemingly contradicts with studies of Estrada et al. (2015) and 
Kollias et al. (2011), that suggested that the size of the attack could be connected with the 
severity of the bad investor sentiment. At the same time the attack in Paris on November 
13th, 2015 was the most fatal one in the time period of 2011 to 2017, but while the reaction 
was significant at the 10% level it didn’t show up across the indices.  To test for the role 
that the number of fatalities plays in the return during the terror events, the explanatory 
regressions are discussed later in the chapter.   
  
In the study by Kolaric and Schiereck (2016) two significant terror events are observed, 
the attack in Paris on November 13th, 2015 and the one in Brussels on March 22nd 2016. 
Both events appear significant also in this thesis’s study, but the attack in Brussels 
appeared more significant than the attack in Paris. The reason for difference could be that 
the airline industry, on which Kolaric and Schiereck focus in their study, had a different 
reaction than the market as a whole, which this study focused on by studying the effects 
of investor sentiment in indices.  
 
Like Kollias et al. suggest in their study, attacks that occurred closely to each other could 
affect the investor sentiment in such way that the subsequent attacks do not experience as 
significant reaction as the earlier attacks. Reactions of investors were incoherent in 2001, 
when the attack of 9/11 caused extreme market reaction with almost -6% downfall in the 
market for two days, and then the attack of 27th of September in Switzerland caused a 
positive significant reaction across the European markets. Same type of reaction could be 
observed in 2017, when concert shooting in Las Vegas resulted in significant positive 
returns on the market shortly after the two van attacks had caused significant negative 
returns in Spain and London. Cases are somewhat similar as the earlier attacks were 
caused by Muslim extremists and the later ones by white extremists. The case could 
indeed be, that when the investors adjust their views about the future from earlier terrorist 
attacks by pricing the risk of terrorism in the assets, the attacks several months apart do 
not result in significant shifts on the market and other factors drive the prices in those 
cases.  
 
When looking at the events together in table 4 and 5 there are no signs of the investor 
sentiment numbing to terrorist attacks.  
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Table 4 Event Study:  two-day CAR returns and t-statistics in parentheses for individual terror attacks. 
Negative returns statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level are shown next 
to t-statistics. Positive returns statistically significant at the 10%('), 5%('') and 1%(''') level.   
 
Table 5 Event Study:  two-day CAR returns and t-statistics in parentheses for individual terror attacks. 
Negative returns statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level are shown next 
to t-statistics. Positive returns statistically significant at the 10%('), 5%('') and 1%(''') level.   
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Table 5 Event Study:  two-day CAR returns and t-statistics in parentheses for individual terror attacks. 
Negative returns statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level are shown next 
to t-statistics. Positive returns statistically significant at the 10%('), 5%('') and 1%(''') level.   
. 
 
Table 6 Event Study:  two-day CAR returns and t-statistics in parentheses for individual terror attacks. 
Negative returns statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level are shown next 
to t-statistics. Positive returns statistically significant at the 10%('), 5%('') and 1%(''') level.   
. 
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It looks like results, documented in studies, that show that the negative reaction caused 
by terrorism event do not last, are not on the minds of the investors when the terror attack 
occurs, and results suggest that fear creeps into the minds of investors, which results in 
temporary loss of confidence in the future (Nikkinen and Vähämaa 2010). Investor 
confidence however returns quickly, suggesting that rational investors, who are aware of 
the fact that drop in the prices from the terrorist attack is not lasting, take the advantage 
of drops in the asset price which returns to the normal market level very quickly. As the 
negative reaction not only has remained, but also increased in the significance, its 
significance in recent years strongly speaks against the hypothesis that the investor 
sentiment towards the terror attacks had lowered over time.  
 
 
6.3 Explanatory regressions 
 
The explanatory regressions were made using the two-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
of MSCI World, that were calculated in the first part of the event study. Firstly, presented 
are the main regressions followed by the more detailed look at the regressions with the 
country effect and additional attack specific independent variables.  
 
6.3.1 Correlation matrix 
 
In the table 6 is the correlation matrix of all the variables used in the performing the 
explanatory regressions. This is important for performing the correct regressions, as the 
significant correlation between the variables can bias the regression. The correlation 
between two variables means that the movement is to some extent integrated, depending 
on the correlation factor. In other words, they tend to move in the same direction and 
therefore explain the dependent variable in regression in the same way. As can be seen 
from the correlation matrix table, there is a significant correlation at the 5% level between 
some variables that are marked with the star. Variables Killed and Wounded have an 
extremely high correlation of 0.99 between each other. Because the events with less than 
ten casualties were dropped, all events had people killed, but there are events where no 
one was wounded. In most cases there are both wounded and killed people, and each 
variable for casualties increases when other does.    
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Table 7 presents the results of the explanatory regressions that were introduced in chapter 
5. Table 7 shows the regression results of the two-day cumulative abnormal returns as 
dependent variable. In the first model, Country and Year are independent variables and 
Killed is the control variable. The first column shows first the coefficient of the variable 
and below in the brackets are the t-statistics. In the second column variance inflation 
factor (VIF) between variables of each regression model is presented separately, as the 
collinearity between the variables is an issue that can affect the coefficients and their 
significance in the regression. All of the models have low VIF figures, that tell there is 
no collinearity issue between the variables.  
 
First model examines how County, Killed and Year variables explain the figure of the 
two-day CAR obtained by the Event study. The R-squared, that tells how well the model  
 
 
Table 7 Explanatory regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns. Where the dependent variable 
is the two-day CARs calculated with the Event Study Abnormal Return technique. Variables 
Country and Year are independent and obtained from the Global Terrorism Index. Early Years 
Dummy is constructed to test for the effect of the years on the CAR variable, it takes the value of 
1 during the years 1995-2010 when the first twenty events this study focus on happened. The 
years from 2011 to 2017 take the value of zero. Variables Killed and Wounded are the control 
variables that were acquired from the Global Terrorism Index. Numbers in parentheses show the 
t-statistics of the coefficients that are shown above them. Statistically significant coefficients at 
the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) are shown.   
 56 
explains the returns, is low at 0.139 which is not surprising as with three variables the 
explanation of returns of 40 separate events is impossible, as so many factors affect the 
returns and investor sentiment. As can be seen from the first model the variable for Killed 
is negatively significant at the 10% level, which means that for the whole event period 
the increase in the amount of fatalities during the terror attack affects the abnormal returns 
negatively. This suggest that investors bad sentiment increases the more attack causes 
fatalities, despite the fact that statistically significant events in the event study didn’t 
have the largest amount of fatalities. The variable Country is positive and not significant, 
because interpretation of the variable is not straightforward from this regression, the 
additional regression is performed for proper understanding if the investors react to the 
terror events of different countries differently. Years is an important variable from the 
hypothesis point of view, because it can tell how the progress of time has affected CARs 
and therefore the investor sentiment. When interpreting the hypothesis from the time 
point of view, it’s expected that the variable Years would be positive, as this would signal 
that when the abnormal returns increase, so would the years also. But instead, the variable 
Years is negative, signalling that to the contrary to the hypothesis, reaction to the terrorism 
has increased over the years and in the earlier time period of 1995 to 2010 the reaction of 
markets was less negative and resulted in higher returns.  
 
6.3.2 Explanatory regressions with focus on countries 
 
Additional explanatory regressions are presented in table 8, with the examination if the 
origin of the attack could have an effect on the cumulative abnormal returns. The 
dummies for all the countries of the attack occurrence were formed so that country in 
which attack occurred got a value of 1 and all other countries dummies got in that event 
a value of zero, in total there are eleven country-dummies for every country that 
experienced an attack during the forty chosen attacks for this study.  
 
In table 8 are five different models, with variation in the control variables, independent 
year variable and country dummies because of the significant collinearity issues between 
them. Introducing the country dummies increased the explanatory factor of the 
regressions, the R-squared, to almost 0.5, this is an expected R-squared figure for the 
model with few variables that account only for the terror attack, as rather many factors 
affect the stock markets. When taking look at the distribution of negative to positive 
CAR’s in the tables (event study tables) then it’s evident that there were many explanatory 
factors, that are not accounted for in these models, that for example explain why there 
were positive market reaction during the terror attacks.   The control variables killed and 
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wounded remained negatively significant. Variables Year or Early Years Dummy didn’t 
play the significant role in these models.   
 
 
 
Table 8 Additional explanatory regression of MSCI World index two-day Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns during the terrorist attacks. CAR figures were calculated according to the Event Study 
Abnormal Returns –methodology. Variables Country and Year are independent. Variable Early Years 
Dummy was constructed that the years of the first twenty events ranging from 1995 to 2010 got the 
value of 1, and the years of the latest 20 events ranging from 2011 to 2017 got the value of zero. 
Dummies for countries were constructed that each time the terror attack occurred in country in question 
the value for that country was 1 and for other countries it was 0. Numbers in parentheses show the t-
statistics of the coefficients that are shown above them. Statistically significant coefficients at the 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) are shown next to t-statistics.   
 
Table 9 Additional explanatory regression of MSCI World index two-day Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns during the terrorist attacks. CAR figures were calculated according to the Event Study 
Abnormal Returns –methodology. Variables Country and Year are independent. Variable Early Years 
Dummy was constructed that the years of the first twenty events ranging from 1995 to 2010 got the 
value of 1, and the years of the latest 20 events ranging from 2011 to 2017 got the value of zero. 
Dummies for countries were constructed that each time the terror attack occurred in country in question 
the value for that country was 1 and for other countries it was 0. Numbers in parentheses show the t-
statistics of the coefficients that are shown above them. Statistically significant coefficients at the 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) are shown next to t-statistics.   
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In the first model, where the dummy for Russia was left out, Switzerland had a significant 
positive impact on the CAR figure. From the forty events, only one occurred in 
Switzerland and that was the attack on 27th of September 2001. As can be seen from the 
table (Event study table 1) the market reaction during the event was significantly positive. 
The reason might be, that the price for terror risk has already been reflected in the prices 
as the attack of 9/11 was just two weeks before. There is also a possibility that the 
investors react to the attackers differently. Behind the attack of 9/11 was an organized 
terrorist group Al Qaida, while in the case of Switzerland it is at least not known if there 
was any terrorist organization backing the Swiss attacker. Switzerland dummy remained 
significant at the 5% level in every of the 5 models. The closer inspection if the attackers 
had an impact on investor sentiment is presented in Table 9 and discussed later.  
 
Interesting observation is that in the fifth model, when the dummy for Russia was 
introduced and dummy for United States was abandoned, dummy for France became 
significant at 10% level. From the forty attacks three occurred in France during the years 
of 2015-2016. First was the attack of Charlie Hebdo that took place on 7th of January 
2015, the market didn’t show any negative reaction during the attack, instead there was a 
positive significant reaction, to which one explanation could be the January effect. Second 
attack occurred during the concert of Eagles of Death Metal, investor sentiment could be 
seen dropping, but it wasn’t anything extreme, that would result in significant results. 
Attack in 2016 was when a van rammed into the crowd in Nice in July. This attack didn’t 
result in negative reaction, but similar terror attacks in United Kingdom and Spain in 2017 
shows significant drop in investor sentiment that resulted in immediate fall of stock prices 
on the event days.   
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6.3.3 Impact of attack characteristics on CARs 
 
The results of regular explanatory regression lead to closer investigation if the 
characteristics of the attack had any explanatory power in CARs. In table 9 are shown the 
2-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Country -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(-0.334) (-0.557) (-1.438) (-0.294) (-1.405)
Killed -0.000* -0.000* -0.000
(-1.856) (-1.911) (-1.465)
Wounded -0.000* -0.000
(-1.905) (-1.508)
Year -0.001* -0.001*
(-1.963) (-1.906)
Early years Dummy 0.010** 0.006 0.006
(2.369) (1.469) (1.456)
Target -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.805) (-1.124) (-1.441) (-0.726) (-1.370)
Type 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.235) (0.351) (0.522) (0.169) (0.463)
Attacker 0.002 0.002* 0.002
(1.439) (1.696) (1.471)
ChechenRebels 0.009 0.009
(0.948) (0.917)
MuslimExtremists 0.007 0.007
(0.837) (0.849)
RIRA 0.037** 0.037**
(2.565) (2.577)
WhiteExtremists 0.018* 0.018*
(1.884) (1.889)
Observations 40 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.215 0.250 0.406 0.219 0.408
Table 9 Additional explanatory regressions of two-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns of MSCI 
World index. Variables Target, Type and Attacker are independent. From the attacker variable, 
the dummy variables for each type of attacker are formed in a way, that every time the attack 
was done by certain group it would get a 1 and 0 otherwise. Numbers in parentheses show the t-
statistics of the coefficients that are shown above them. Statistically significant coefficients at 
the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) are shown next to t-statistics.    
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results of explanatory regressions with five different models that test different regression 
scenarios. Model one and four represent the basic regressions with control variables 
Killed and Wounded respectively and Year as in independent variable. In these models 
where the whole-time period was tested, none of the type of the attacker, the target of the 
attack or the type of the terrorist act had any significance.  
 
However, the model three and five, where the independent variable Years was switched 
to Early Years Dummy, show interesting results. Firstly, the Attacker variable became 
significant, which led to a closer examination of the variable, by creation of an individual 
Dummy variable for each attacker group. The dummy variable for Unknown was left out 
of regressions in order to avoid dummy trap. Dummy variables for Real Irish Republican 
Army(RIRA) become significant at 5% level, when the dummy for the Early Attack Years 
is used. Dummy for White Extremists becomes also significant at 10% level when the 
dummy for the early years is used in both scenarios. The signs of these variables suggest 
that during the early years, when the attacks were made either by RIRA or white 
extremists, the cumulative abnormal returns tended to increase. These results however, 
can’t be generalized as in the data sample of terrorist events, only one was carried out by 
RIRA. To draw a suggestive line between the attacks of the terrorist group RIRA and 
CAR returns, much broader sample of terrorist events performed by the group should be 
analysed.  
 
All attacker dummies got positive coefficients. The dummy variable for White Extremists 
got an interesting coefficient, as it not only is positive, but also statistically significant. In 
time period from 1995 to 2010 there were four terrorist attacks and in time period of 2011 
to 2017 five attacks were performed by white extremists. Regression results show that in 
the earlier time period attacks performed by white extremists got significantly higher 
CARs thank attack with Muslim attackers or Chechen Rebels. Cautious suggestion is that 
white terrorist do not cause the same amount of fear in investors of developed countries 
as other terrorist groups. There is a possibility that investors had already intercorporated 
the fear of domestic terrorism in their stock prices and therefore, these attacks do not 
cause falling in stock prices.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS  
 
The effects of terrorism have been a hot topic in the financial studies mostly since the 
attack of 9th of September 2001. The market’s negative reaction to terrorism has been 
documented widely, but most of the studies focus mainly on several events. The main 
objective for this study was to examine the development of the investor sentiment to the 
terror attacks over time. The study offers examination of prolonged time period of modern 
terrorism, focusing on forty terror attacks in developed western countries from 1995 to 
2017. The indices were chosen to reflect the regions of occurrence of the attacks. In order 
to identify the change in the investor sentiment during the years, the event study 
methodology is used to identify the abnormal returns around the attack. The abnormal 
returns are then tested with explanatory regressions, in order to identify what factors 
closely related to terror attacks could possibly affect the investor sentiment.    
 
The hypothesis of this thesis was, whether investors have grown numb to terrorism over 
time. The effect should be seen by decrease in a bad investor sentiment, in other words 
less significant negative reactions in event CARs. Study was motivated by the study of 
Goel, Cagle and Shawky (2017) whom in their study couldn’t see coherent results 
between the attacks, which in their study was analysed as a suggestion that it could be a 
sign of investor sentiment numbing.  
 
The study of abnormal returns during the event days of terrorist attacks shows that like 
Goel et al (2017) notice, the results are incoherent, and investor sentiment is not uniform 
from attack to attack, there isn’t also evidence of the numbing effect on the contrary the 
significance of the returns in the more recent years suggest the opposite: investor 
sentiment to the terrorist attack has increased over the years.  
 
Data sample, from forty terrorist events chosen for this study, was split in half for the 
easier observation of hypothesis. First twenty events span from 1995 to 2010, had eight 
negatively significant events, from which two were significant at the 1% level. The period 
from 2011 to 2017 represents most current twenty terror events examined in this study. 
During this time period there were nine statistically significant terrorist events, from 
which six were extremely significant at the 1% level. In order to accept the hypothesis, 
the abnormal returns should have been much milder in the more current time period and 
the amount of significant terrorist events should have also been lower. Because the earlier 
time period span is fifteen years and more current time period span is only seven, the 
 62 
development of the investor sentiment suggests that unlike hypothesized, no numbing 
effect in the investor sentiment towards terrorist attacks could be seen in the stock indices. 
Therefore, the hypothesis of this thesis was rejected, because the results of the abnormal 
returns event study suggests the contrary: investors reaction to terrorist attacks is more 
negative in more recent years that it was before.    
 
Both time periods experienced the same amount of significantly positive abnormal 
returns, but in more recent period they were less statistically significant than in the earlier 
time period. While it can’t be stated that terrorist attacks caused positive reaction in the 
investors, the comparison between the two-time periods is suggesting that in more recent 
time period terrorism could be hindering the positive development of asset prices.  
 
In order to find explanation to the abnormal returns, explanatory regressions were applied 
in different variations. The main purpose was to test, whether the time periods had any 
effect. And regression results suggest, that during the earlier years, the abnormal returns 
were significantly higher than during the events in more current time period. Regressions 
also showed that amount of killed and wounded in the attack had a significant negative 
effect on abnormal returns, which is in line with previous studies.  
 
Because markets reaction to the terrorist events were incoherent, additional attack specific 
variables were regressed in order to gain more insight on if these factors could explain 
why certain events cause negative and other positive abnormal returns. Only in 
regressions with dummy accounting for earlier attack years did the additional Attacker 
variable became significant, but even then, it was positive. Meaning that in earlier attack 
years, certain attacker types resulted in more positive abnormal returns. Still the most 
explanatory variables to the abnormal returns were the amount of people died and got 
wounded in the attack.   
 
This study offered an expanded overview of the attacks that occurred in western non-
conflict countries in over past two (or three?) decades. Based on the results of the study, 
the hypothesis that investor sentiment has decreased towards terrorist events had been 
rejected, as the results show the contrary effect, investor sentiment can be seen increasing 
compared to the time period of 1995 to 2010. Further investigations on the factors that 
drive negative investor sentiment should be made to make conclusions, why some 
terrorist attacks result in negative reactions and some with positive. 
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